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Deception in Context: Coding Nonverbal Cues, Situational 
Variables and Risk of Detection 
 
 
Abstract 
There are many situations in which deception may arise and understanding the behaviors 
associated with it are compounded by various contexts in which it may occur. This paper sets 
out a coding protocol for identifying cues to deception and reports on three studies, in which 
deception was studied in different contexts. The contexts involved manipulating risks (i.e., 
probability) of being detected and reconnaissance, both of which are related to terrorist 
activities. Two of the studies examined the impact of changing the risks of deception 
detection, whilst the third investigated increased cognitive demand of duplex deception tasks 
including reconnaissance and deception. In all three studies, cues to deception were analyzed 
in relation to observable body movements and subjective impressions given by participants. 
In general, the results indicate a pattern of hand movement reduction by deceivers, and 
suggest the notion that raising the risk of detection influences deceivers’ behaviors. 
Participants in the higher risk condition displayed increased negative affect (found in 
deceivers) and tension (found in both deceivers and truth-tellers) than those in lower risk 
conditions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Behavioral cues related to deception include both verbal and nonverbal markers (DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Vrij, 2008) exhibited by deceivers who deliberately conceal their intent (e.g., 
Kirchhuebel & Howard, in press; Lawson et al., in press). The study of these factors is 
complex and compounded by the various contexts in which these behaviors may occur (Vrij, 
2008), as well as individual differences (e.g., personality traits) that may influence 
fundamental psychological processes of deception (Vrij, 2008) and perceptions of risk of 
being detected (Rhodes & Pivik, 2011). Previous research has revealed three fundamental 
processes of deception: emotion, cognitive effort, and attempted behavioral control (Vrij, 
2008; Zuckerman et al., 1981). Nonverbal and verbal deception cues are linked to these 
psychological processes underlying acts of deception.  
While it has been argued that nonverbal cues are not as stable as some verbal indicators 
(e.g., Vrij & Granhag, 2012), cues presented by deceivers are determined to some extent by 
the context in which they occur. For example, a terrorist may not have to speak to anyone 
when passing through a public space, thus only nonverbal cues may be available to be 
assessed by others. We considered that the contextual variables such as risk of being detected 
could not only influence decisions of deception (Sip et al., 2010), but also alter the cues 
presented by deceivers. Given the possible effect of contextual variables, we conducted three 
studies in different deception contexts (see details in section 1.2). In addition, research in the 
field of deception cues is still at the exploratory stage and the current approaches point 
towards research assessing deception cues from different channels (DePaulo & Bond, 2012; 
Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). With this in mind, it is useful to gain further understanding of 
nonverbal cues via the present research that focuses on cues that are observable to other 
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people, so as to assess what nonverbal deception cues could be spotted where detailed 
behavioral analyses are not feasible. Such cues should ideally be observed from a distance, as 
it is not always possible to approach suspects in public crowded spaces.  
It has been argued that no single cue can reliably identify deception due to the lack of 
developed coding schemes that have generated poor results in previous studies (Vrij, 2008). 
Therefore, in the current research, a coding protocol (detailed in section 2) was developed as 
an elaboration of a previous scheme related to cues identified across different sections of the 
body (Vrij et al., 1996). Impressions given by deceivers based on the fundamental processes 
of deception (e.g., negative affect in relation to negative emotions) were also coded and 
analyzed.  
 
1. 1. Psychological Processes Underlying Deception 
In the literature, there are many nonverbal cues related to the underlying psychological 
processes of deception. Some are negative emotions such as fear or guilt, whilst others are 
positive emotions, such as excitement, relief and pride (Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Frank, 1993; 
Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). There are macro negative emotional cues such as reduced hand 
and arm movements during speech (Vrij, 2008) and positive cues such as smiling (Memon et 
al., 2003).  
The process of lying may require extra cognitive effort as liars suppress true 
information whilst forming lies and remembering false information (Langleben et al., 2002; 
Spence et al., 2001; Vrij et al., 2008; Walczyk et al., 2005). Liars also need to monitor their 
own behavior (Vrij & Mann, 2005) and their target’s reactions (Burgoon et al., 2008), which 
places a high demand on the liar’s cognitive processing (Carrión et al., 2010). Visible cues to 
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cognitive effort are, for instance, fewer hand and/or arm movements (Ekman, 1997; Memon 
et al., 2003), less blinking (Bagley & Manelis, 1979), more gaze aversion (Ekman, 1997; 
Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005). Attempted behavioral control varies at an individual level 
and can be influenced by emotional demands and cognitive load. However, deliberate 
behavioral self-regulation can sometimes make a liar’s behavior appear contrived, tense, and 
over-controlled (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; Vrij, 2008).  
 
1. 2. Cues to Deception and Contextual Variables 
Cues related to the fundamental processes of emotion, cognitive effort, and attempted 
behavioral control are not consistently presented by liars. For example, fewer hand or arm 
movements can be an indication of cognitive overload (Ekman, 1997; Memon et al, 2003), 
negative emotions (Vrij, 2008), or an intention to deceive (Lawson et al, in press). Therefore, 
it is widely believed that no single cue can reliably identify deception (DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Vrij, 2008; Vrij et al., 2001). In addition, according to Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996) liars adjust their behavior and may try to avoid ‘dishonest’ 
behaviors (Burgoon et al., 1996), which increases the difficulty to spot deception cues 
reliably. The inconsistencies of the psychological processes involved in deception supports 
the view that deception cues may vary in different contexts (Vrij, 2008). Therefore, we 
consider context as a crucial factor in detecting deception cues. We investigated deceptive 
behavior in different forms and situations so as to broaden the established understanding of 
nonverbal deception cues.  
Given that context can determine deceivers’ behavior, we investigated deception-
related behaviors in settings that are relevant in the fields of terrorism prevention, criminal 
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investigation and promotion of public safety. The present research sought to investigate 
situations both inside and outside traditional laboratory settings, where participants usually 
remain seated throughout experiments with an interviewer. Three studies were designed to 
assess deception in different contexts: 
 Lying in front of peers in a semi public space (a classroom). 
 Lying during interaction with another person in a private space (in a laboratory). 
 Lying and reconnaissance whilst passing through a security control point in a public 
space (the corridor of a building). 
 
The first goal of the present research was to investigate observable nonverbal cues in relation 
to deception. We did not target specific cues, but tested a number of nonverbal body 
movements across body sections, as observed by people using the coding protocol, as 
specified in section 2. This is due to the fact that nonverbal cues are unstable and inconsistent 
across contexts. In addition, we investigated impressions given by deceivers, based on the 
fundamental processes of deception.  
From the above approach, four general hypotheses assessing nonverbal cues related to 
deception were proposed. Hypothesis 1, deceivers will present different amounts of 
observable body movements, as compared to truth-tellers. Hypothesis 2, impressions related 
to emotional process of deception (e.g., negative and/or positive affect) will be presented by 
deceivers as compared to truth-tellers. Hypothesis 3, impressions related to cognitive effort of 
deception will be presented by deceivers as compared to truth-tellers. Hypothesis 4, 
impressions related to attempted behavioral control processes of deception will be presented 
by deceivers as compared to truth-tellers. 
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Deception cues can be influenced by contextual variables such as the degree of stakes 
of deception (i.e., the extent of the positive or negative consequence of deception) (e.g., 
Hartwig et al., 2006; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012) and task complexity (Lancaster et al., 2012; 
Vrij et al., 2011). Contextual variables can introduce variance with regard to specific 
deception cues. When faced with higher stakes, liars tend to illustrate more behavioral 
reductions and signs of increased cognitive activity (i.e., they appear to be ‘thinking hard’) 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; Vrij & Mann, 2001). Considering that deceiving is often a risk-
taking behavior, factors that influence it could be related to those that influence risk-taking 
behavior as well. According to cognitive psychologists, people who engage in risk-taking 
behaviors do not only consider the extent of the negative outcome if they are detected (in 
relation to stakes), but also weigh the probability of being detected (Breakwell, 2007; Sip et 
al., 2010). The probability of deception detection is therefore important as well as the extent 
of the consequences of deception (i.e., stakes). Both of these may influence the involvement 
of the underlying psychological processes of deception such as fear and cognitive effort. In 
the present paper, we refer to the risk of deception detection in describing the probability of 
being detected. Therefore, our research manipulated the degree of risk in order to assess how 
it might influence deception cues. 
In Study 1, this was achieved through the introduction of evaluated and non-evaluated 
deception conditions, since introducing evaluation of truthfulness increases the possibility of 
being detected. In Study 2, the degree of risk was manipulated by altering the evaluators: that 
is, evaluations performed by security staff were designed to elicit a higher level of risk of 
deception detection, compared to evaluations performed by a lay person. Given the 
discussion above, we proposed that higher risks might result in a higher extent of 
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involvement of psychological processes. We therefore propose another two general 
hypotheses (regardless of specific cues) in testing the effect of risks of deception detection. 
Hypothesis 5, there will be a greater extent of observable nonverbal cue(s) (either body 
movement(s) and/or impression(s)) exhibited in deceivers when the risk of detection is 
higher, compared to lower risk levels. Hypothesis 6, the extent of such observable cues will 
be positively correlated with the level of risk of deception detection; the higher the risk the 
more cues will be observed. 
Deceiving does not usually happen as a single event but often entails multiple 
deceptions resulting in increased cognitive effort to remember scripts, control behavior and 
monitor the target’s responses (Vrij, 2008). It has been found that increasing cognitive 
loading can elicit deception cues (e.g., Lancaster et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2009). In order to 
investigate this, in Study 3, a duplex lying and reconnaissance task was designed to provide 
higher levels of task difficulty than single deception tasks. From this, a final hypothesis was 
developed. Hypothesis 7, deceivers performing a reconnaissance task in addition to lying will 
display more observable nonverbal cues than deceivers performing only one task. 
Demographic characteristics (age, gender, and cultural differences) related to individual 
differences may influence nonverbal (Vrij, 2008) and risk taking behavior (Byrnes et al., 
1999; Rhodes & Pivik, 2011). They are not the focus of this study, but they were included as 
covariates in the data analysis so as to prevent a significant influence on the results. 
 
2. A CODING PROTOCOL FOR IDENTIFYING CUES TO DECEPTION 
Across all three studies, behavior data were collected and edited into video clips. There were 
337 clips in total (32 clips in Study 1, 210 clips in Study 2, and 95 clips in Study 3) that were 
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then assessed using a coding system based on the nonverbal cues literature (DePaulo, et al, 
2003; Vrij, et al., 1996; Vrij, 2008) (Table I). The specific movements coded were slightly 
different according to study settings (e.g., participants were seated in Study 2, but were 
standing/walking in Studies 1 and 3). Hand and arm data were scrutinized in more detail 
(Table II). 
 
TABLE I ABOUT HERE  
TABLE II ABOUT HERE  
 
Three raters (MSc and PhD students in social sciences at a UK university) subjectively coded 
10% of the video clips, taken as a random sample, for inter-rater reliability test purposes. A 
selection criterion for inter rater reliability (Cronbach’s alpha > .70) was applied across 
Studies 1, 2 and 3 for each body section and impression category. Since adequate values for 
inter-rater reliability tests were obtained, numerical data obtained from the three raters were 
averaged and combined under each item with the remaining video clips that were then rated 
by two of the three raters. The raters were blind to the experimental conditions and 
hypotheses and coded the frequency and duration of movements across the body sections 
using separate 7-point scales ranging from 1 = exists (frequency) or brief (duration) to 7 = 
always (frequency) or whole session (duration). 
As introduced in sections 1 and 1.2, detailed categorizations of impressions given by 
participants were also coded (Table III). In Studies 1 and 2, raters coded impressions elicited 
by participants in the video using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 5 = to a 
great extent. The rating scheme was extended by using a 7-point scale across the same 
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descriptors in Study 3 to increase the sensitivity of the data.  
 
TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
 
Two filtering steps were performed on the dependent variables before data analyses were 
conducted: 
 In order to filter out movements that seldom occurred in the participant pool, 
descriptive statistics were obtained and movement variables that were shown by fewer 
than 30% of the participants were excluded from the data analysis. 
 As the cut-off point filtered out different variables across the three studies, the 
common items of dependent variables in the three studies were retained.  
 
A series of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted within each study for 
movement and impression variables. Bonferroni corrections were employed to reduce the 
chance of Type I errors (Field, 2005) and demographic information including age, gender, 
nationality (western and non-western) were assessed as covariates. The missing values in 
body movement variables were coded as ‘0’, representing the ‘absent’ status of movements. 
 
3. STUDY 1: LYING IN FRONT OF PEERS 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants. 
For this study, 34 University students were recruited. Participants with invalid data 
(e.g., incomplete/unclear video footages) were excluded. Valid data from 32 participants (17 
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males, 15 females, Mage = 22.86 years, SD = 3.89) were included in the analyses. To 
participate, students were required to have normal, or corrected to normal, vision and hearing, 
normal ability of body movement and communication.  
 
3.1.2. Apparatus. 
The experiment, conducted by three researchers, took place in a University lecture 
room. An envelope for each participant contained an instruction sheet, an evaluation sheet, 
and a token. The token was a small card with one of nine possible combinations of its 
features based on three colors (e.g., red, blue or yellow) and three shapes (e.g., heart, square 
or triangle). A short self-rating manipulation check questionnaire assessing e.g., levels of 
nervousness, perception of levels of task difficulty and motivation, and a demographic 
information completion sheet (e.g., age, gender and nationality) were included. Two high-
definition video cameras were used to record behaviors. Each participant received a 
confectionery reward for completing the study.  
 
3.1.3. Design and procedure. 
In this study the independent variables of deception and degree of risks were 
manipulated in a 2 (veracity) × 2 (risk level) between-subjects design and participants were 
randomly assigned to the four groups. Veracity was manipulated by instructing participants to 
deceive or tell truth about the color and shape of the token they received. Risk levels were 
manipulated by whether or not asking peers of the participants to evaluate whether the 
participants were being deceptive about the token they had. Upon receiving an envelope 
containing task instructions and a token, participants were instructed not to expose the token 
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during the experiment. Each participant stood at the front of the classroom and gave a short 
presentation to the audience, including their student number, name, a curious fact about 
themselves (e.g., “I run five miles every day”) and a description of their token containing its 
color and shape (e.g., “I have a blue triangle”). The content of the presentation, as related to 
participants themselves, was designed with the purpose of enhancing motivation to perform 
well by introducing self identity-related tasks (DePaulo et al., 2003).  
The group ‘deceiver & evaluated’ (DE) lied about the token and were evaluated by their 
peers. Then the group ‘truth-teller & evaluated’ (TE) performed the task and did not lie about 
the token but were also evaluated by their peers. Participants in these two groups were told 
that the overall group ranking was to be announced later to the class members; however, this 
was designed purely as a mechanism to manipulate the level of risk involved in the evaluated 
presentations. Groups of ‘deceiver & non-evaluated’ (DN) and ‘truth-teller & non-evaluated’ 
(TN) participated similarly as DE and TE but were not evaluated by their peers. After their 
presentations, participants completed the questionnaire pack together with the manipulation 
check questions and then received their confectionery reward for their participation. 
Behavioral data were recorded using video cameras and transferred into numerical data 
through the coding processes. 
 
3.2. Results 
ANCOVAs were conducted for all dependent variables, Bonferroni corrections were 
performed (six tests ran in total, Corrected α = .01). Age, gender and nationality 
(western/non-western) were retained as covariates. Based on the coding of video data, the 
results of ANCOVAs for the significant dependent variables are presented in Table IV. Inter 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
rater reliability for the significant dependent variables in the overall coding are Cronbach’s α 
= .70 (hand holding); and α = .64 (hand/arm).  
 
TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
 
By controlling for the covariates including age, gender and nationality (see details in Table 
IV), a significant effect of veracity emerged for holding of hands: F(1, 21) = 4.75, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .18, with Cohen’s d = 0.83. This illustrated that hand holding was higher for liars (M = 
4.74, SE = 1.13) than truth-tellers (M = 1.36, SE = 1.05). Holding of hands was classified 
under hand/arm movements and indicated movement reduction and moderately tense 
behavior (Mehrabian, 1968). These findings support Hypothesis 1, that deceivers would 
present different amounts of observable body movements, when compared to truth-tellers. 
There was a trend towards significance for hand/arm movements for the evaluation 
variable (risk of detection): F(1, 21) = 4.29, p = .051, ηp
2 = .17, Cohen’s d = -0.80. The 
evaluation condition yielded fewer hand/arm movements (M = 2.19, SE = 1.12) than the non-
evaluation condition (M = 5.90, SE = 1.39). As decreased limb movement is one of the 
recognized cues to deception, this finding leads to further consideration of Hypothesis 5, that 
there will be a greater extent of observable nonverbal cue(s) (either body movement(s) and/or 
impression(s)) exhibited in deceivers when the risk of detection is higher, compared to lower 
risk levels. Nonetheless, the finding of a trend of effect for risk across veracity conditions 
indicates that the same magnification effect applies for truth-tellers as well. No covariates 
were statistically significant in relation to level of risk. 
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3.3. Discussion 
This study revealed that risk (i.e., probability of deception detection) might have a similar 
effect as deception in altering nonverbal behavior (e.g. a reduction in hand movements). The 
finding suggests that not only the stakes (i.e., the extent of consequences of deception) as 
found in previous studies, but also risks (i.e., the possibility of being detected) might magnify 
the effect on deceivers’ behaviors. However, similar to stakes, enhancing risks can lead to 
misjudgment as to whether or not someone is lying, since truth-tellers under higher risks can 
present similar reduced hand movements as deceivers. In addition, it is unknown whether 
there are individual differences in perceiving risk levels of deception detection. To further 
understanding these questions, Study 2 used a within-subjects design to compare behavior 
exhibited by the same person across different conditions of veracity and risks of deception 
detection. Different levels of risks (low, moderate, and high) were assessed to investigate if 
the extent of cues presented by the same individual were affected by increased risk levels. 
  
4. STUDY 2: LYING DURING INTERACTION WITH ANOTHER PERSON 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants. 
For this study, 40 University students were recruited. Participants with invalid data 
(e.g., incomplete/unclear video footages) were excluded. Valid data from 35 participants (7 
males, 28 females, Mage = 27.40 years, SD = 7.91) were included in the analyses. To 
participate, students were required to have normal, or corrected to normal, vision and hearing, 
normal ability of body movement and communication.  
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4.1.2. Apparatus. 
Each participant received a folder containing either one article (about education) or two 
articles (one about education and another about deception). The same covariate and 
manipulation check questions were used from Study 1. Two high-definition video cameras 
were used to record behaviors. This study was conducted by three researchers, two of whom 
took on the roles of confederates (e.g., ‘student’ and ‘security guard’). Each participant 
received a £5 voucher as well as a confectionery reward for completing the study.  
 
4.1.3. Design and Procedure. 
In this study the independent variables of deception and risk were manipulated in a 2 
(veracity) × 3 (level of risk) within-subjects design, and the assignment of the six conditions 
was counterbalanced. Participants either deceived or told truth about the articles they had in 
each condition. The level of risk of deception detection was manipulated with the 
confederates engaging in face-to-face evaluations regarding the veracity of participant 
statements about the article. There are three levels of the risk variable, the lowest, moderate, 
and highest risk of being detected.  
In the deception conditions participants were provided with a folder containing two 
written articles and instructed to conceal and lie about having the deception article throughout 
the tasks. The deception article gave a non-detailed introduction of deception. It did not 
include any information about nonverbal cues of deception, in order to prevent influencing 
participants’ nonverbal behavior. Participants were first left alone in the room to read the 
articles whilst their behavior was video recorded (condition ‘deceiving & alone’ = lowest 
risk). This condition involved no social interaction and therefore there was the lowest risk of 
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being detected amongst the three levels of the risk variable. In this section, participants’ 
behavior was analyzed so as to identify whether they demonstrated any specific cues in 
relation to deception. This was based on previous work (Lawson et al., in press), which 
indicated that individuals intending to lie would behave differently to those intending to tell 
the truth. Although no statement was involved, deceivers were experiencing concealed 
intention of deceiving whereas truth-tellers were not. After five minutes, a confederate who 
assumed the appearance of a student entered the room and interacted with the participant 
(condition ‘deceiving & layperson’ = moderate risk). During this phase of the experiment the 
participant was encouraged to act normally and not to draw attention to him/herself or raise 
suspicions of having the deception article. After five minutes the student left and a ‘security 
guard’ entered the room and conducted a mock security interview (condition ‘deceiving & 
security guard’ = highest risk). The participants were instructed that the guard was skilled in 
deception detection and had the authority to remove them from the study if they were caught 
lying. For experimental consistency, the guard interviewed all participants and purposefully 
‘failed’ to detect any deceptive cues in any participants. 
In the truth-telling conditions (‘truth-telling & alone’, ‘truth-telling & layperson’, and 
‘truth-telling & security guard’) the task was identical to the deception conditions except that 
participants did not have the deception article and thus did not have to lie about it to the 
confederates. Since truth-tellers would still be evaluated in two of the sections, we 
intentionally removed the deception article from what they would be reading so as to prevent 
the impact of the deception contents on truth-tellers (e.g., the deception contents might lead 
to task-irrelevant nervousness while being asked about deception during the security 
interview). The time between the sessions ranged from one to two minutes. After each set of 
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three conditions participants completed the manipulation check questions. They then 
completed the covariate battery followed by a debrief session and were given a £5 voucher 
and an extra confectionery reward for their participation. Behavioral data were recorded 
using video cameras and transferred into numerical data through the coding processes. 
 
4.2. Results 
Repeated-measures ANCOVAs were conducted for all dependent variables, Bonferroni 
corrections were performed (12 tests ran in total, Corrected α = .00). Covariates of age, 
gender and nationality (western/non-western) were retained in the tests. The results of 
ANCOVAs for the significant dependent variables are presented in Table V. Inter rater 
reliability for the significant dependent variables in the overall coding are Cronbach’s α = .64 
(hand holding); α = .65 (negative affect); and α = .81 (tension). 
 
TABLE V ABOUT HERE 
 
By controlling for the covariates including age, gender and nationality the results revealed no 
significant effects of deception for either movement or impression variables. Hand holding 
movements were significant for risks, F(2, 56) = 3.46, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .11. The risk level 1(i.e., 
alone in room) (M = 3.66, SE = 0.27), 95% CI [3.10, 4.22] and level 2 (i.e., with layperson) 
(M = 5.93, SE = 0.71), 95% CI [4.47, 7.38]; and level 3 (i.e., with confederate security guard) 
(M = 7.23, SE = 0.72), 95% CI [5.76, 8.70]. The results showed a significant main effect of 
risks on hand holding, where such movements were increased in the two conditions with 
social interactions (level 2 & level 3), compared to the condition when participants were 
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alone (level 1). However, the difference between level 2 and level 3 did not reach the 
significance level, according to Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests (paired t-test). 
A significant main effect of risks emerged in the impression of negative affect 
(unpleased impression), F(2, 56) = 4.24, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .13. There was greater negative affect 
associated with higher risk levels with 95% CI [1.55, 1.85] for level 1 (M = 1.70, SE = 0.07), 
95% CI [1.67, 1.98] for level 2 (M = 1.82, SE = 0.08), and 95% CI [1.84, 2.21] for level 3 (M 
= 2.03, SE = 0.09). The subsequent Bonferroni corrected post-hoc test showed a significant 
difference of negative affect between level 1 and level 3, t(34) = -3.10, p < .01; and level 2 
and level 3, t(34) = -2.60, p = .01. However, such significant difference was only found in 
deceivers and even then not between level 2 and level 3. The impression of tension was 
mainly influenced by risks as well, F(1.63, 45.52) = 3.92, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .12, level 1(M = 2.56, 
SE = 0.06), 95% CI [2.43, 2.69], level 2 (M = 2.78, SE = 0.10), 95% CI [2.58, 2.97], and level 
3 (M = 3.18, SE = 0.06), 95% CI [3.05, 3.30]. Tension impression was significantly different 
between level 1 and level 3, as well as level 2 and level 3. The subsequent Bonferroni 
corrected post-hoc tests showed a significant difference of tension impression between level 1 
and level 2, t(34) = -3.37, p < .01, in truth-tellers but not in deceivers.   
These findings of the main effect of risk partially support Hypothesis 5, that there will 
be a greater extent of observable nonverbal cue(s) (either body movement(s) and/or 
impression(s)) exhibited in deceivers when the risk of detection is higher, compared to lower 
risk levels. The significant difference in the extent of nonverbal cues between levels of risks 
was not found in all comparisons. Therefore the results did not completely support 
Hypothesis 6, that the extent of such observable cues would be positively correlated with the 
level of risk of deception detection; the higher the risk the more cues that would be observed. 
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Notably, although the findings suggest that higher risks can lead to increased nonverbal cues 
presented by deceivers than in lower risk conditions, a main effect of risk combines both 
deceivers and truth-tellers.  
 
4.3. Discussion 
Study 2 revealed a main effect of risk that led to reduction in hand movements (hand holding 
is categorized as a reduced hand movement). Hand movements significantly decreased while 
participants engaged in interaction with confederates compared with when they were alone. 
However, it is possible that engaging in conversation changed participants’ hand holding 
movements irrespective of the risk variable. Study 2 also showed that impressions of negative 
affect and tension increases under higher risks. Deceivers showed significant increased 
negative affect in the highest risk condition, compared with the two lower risk conditions. 
Truth-tellers did not show a similar pattern of negative affect. In addition, there was also a 
significant increase in extent of tension impression in the highest risk condition. However, 
both deceivers and truth-tellers were influenced, suggesting that risk has strong influences on 
tension impression regardless of deception. The difference of such nonverbal cues was not 
significantly different between risk level 1 and level 2. However, the highest risk of detection 
(i.e., evaluated by a security confederate) did significantly influence nonverbal cues, 
compared to the other two lower risk levels.  
Given the literature suggesting that increased cognitive loading can enhance the 
detectability of deception indicators (Vrij & Granhag, 2012), Study 3 was designed to assess 
dual deception tasks in order to increase cognitive loading in individuals. This was done to 
investigate if cognitive loading can be more effective in magnifying the difference between 
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deceivers and truth-tellers than risk of detection. The tasks took the form of simulating a 
security identity check as well as a reconnaissance task that could be conducted by terrorists, 
in order to investigate cues that could be observed in such contexts. 
 
5. STUDY 3: LYING AND RECONNAISSANCE WHILST PASING THROUGH A 
SECURITY CONTROL POINT 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Participants. 
For this study, 100 University students were recruited. Participants with invalid data 
(e.g., incomplete/unclear video footages) were excluded. Valid data from 94 participants (22 
males, 72 females, Mage = 26.53 years, SD = 8.66) were included in the analyses. To 
participate, students were required to have normal, or corrected to normal, vision and hearing, 
normal ability of body movement and communication.  
 
5.1.2. Apparatus. 
The experiment was conducted in the corridor of a university main building. Each 
participant placed an adhesive label over their name on their university ID card. The same 
covariate and manipulation check questions were used from Study 1 and Study 2. Two high-
definition video cameras were used to record behaviors. This study was conducted by three 
researchers, one of whom took on the role of a ‘security guard’. Each participant received a 
£5 voucher as well as a confectionery reward for completing the study.  
 
5.1.3. Design and Procedure. 
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In this study the independent variables of duplex deception were manipulated in a 2 
(deception about identity) × 2 (reconnaissance) between-subjects design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four groups. Deception about identity was manipulated by 
instructing participants to either lie or tell the truth about their name. The reconnaissance task 
was manipulated by instructing participants to either covertly memorize objects in the 
environment (e.g., how many chairs in the room) or not to memorize objects. The context of 
this study aimed to simulate a public security checkpoint scenario and typical reconnaissance 
activities conducted in public spaces. 
Participants were asked to pass through a security door set up at the entrance of an 
office. While monitoring the security door a confederate security guard asked for and 
checked each person’s name on the label of their student ID card. Groups of ‘deceiver & 
reconnaissance’ and ‘deceiver & no-reconnaissance’ put a fake name on the label of their 
student ID card and lied about their real names. These groups were informed that they would 
lose entitlement to an extra reward if they were caught lying; this was not applicable for the 
truth tellers. For experimental consistency, the guard interviewed all participants and 
purposefully ‘failed’ to detect deceptive cues in any participants. The ‘deceiver & 
reconnaissance’ group also covertly memorized the notable objects while passing through the 
space. After completing the deception task, they were required to identify observed objects on 
a list and then complete the questionnaire pack.  
The ‘truth-teller & reconnaissance’ group followed the same process but told truth 
about their names. The ‘truth-teller & no-reconnaissance’ group neither lied about their 
names nor performed the reconnaissance task. When the study was completed, the researcher 
debriefed and rewarded each of the participants with a £5 voucher and an extra confectionery 
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for their participation. Behavioral data were recorded using video cameras and transferred 
into numerical data through the coding processes. 
 
5.2. Results 
ANCOVAs were conducted for all dependent variables, and Bonferroni corrections 
were performed (six tests ran in total, Corrected α = .01). Age, gender and nationality 
(western/non-western) were retained as covariates in the tests. The results of ANCOVAs for 
the significant dependent variables are presented in Table VI. Inter rater reliability for the 
significant dependent variables in the overall coding are Cronbach’s α = .84 (trunk); α = .94 
(hand/arm); α = .88 (positive affect); and α = .74 (eye/eye brow). 
 
TABLE VI ABOUT HERE 
 
By controlling for the covariates including age, gender and nationality there was a trend 
towards significance in deception with trunk movements: F(1, 85) = 3.82, p = .054, ηp
2 
= .05, 
Cohen’s d = - 0.41, revealing that liars presented fewer trunk movements (M = 1.69, SE = 
0.25) than truth-tellers (M = 2.40, SE = 0.25). A similar trend of decreased hand and arm 
movements emerged, F(1, 85) = 3.85, p = .053, ηp
2 = .04, Cohen’s d = - 0.41, with fewer such 
movements for deceivers (M = 2.41, SE = 0.45) than truth-tellers (M = 3.68, SE = 0.45). 
These findings indicate a trend of decreases in limb movements providing support towards 
Hypothesis 1, that deceivers would present different amounts of observable body movements, 
when compared to truth-tellers. Subjective impressions of positive affect were significantly 
influenced by deception, F(1, 85) = 5.94, p < .05, ηp
2 = .07, Cohen’s d = 0.51. Liars displayed 
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more positive affect (M = 3.01, SE = 0.16) compared to truth-tellers (M = 2.45, SE = 0.16) 
supporting Hypothesis 2, that more impressions related to emotional process of deception 
(either negative and/or positive affect) would be presented by deceivers than truth-tellers. 
Eye/eyebrow movements were significantly influenced by reconnaissance, F(1, 85) = 
5.68, p < .05, ηp
2 = .06, Cohen’s d = 0.51. Covert information collection conditions yielded 
more eye/eyebrow movements (M = 3.79, SE = 0.15) than conditions where there were no 
reconnaissance activities (M = 3.28, SE = 0.15).  
 
5.3. Discussion 
The trend for hand movement reduction found in this study reflected the similar findings in 
Studies 1. In addition, positive affect was observed as an indicator associated with the 
underlying emotion process. The replicated trend of hand movement reduction suggests it 
might be a consistent cue across the two contexts assessed in Studies 1 and 3. The only cue 
found in relation to reconnaissance was the increased eye/eyebrow movements. However, 
this is considered a task-related result since participants looked around as part of the 
reconnaissance activity. This does not support Hypothesis 7, that deceivers performing a 
reconnaissance task in addition to lying would display more observable nonverbal cues than 
deceivers performing only one task. The failure to find significant cues in relation to the dual 
deception tasks suggests that nonverbal cues we have investigated might not be as sensitive 
as verbal cues (e.g., as found in Vrij et al., 2011) in relation to cognitive loading. Hypotheses 
3 and 4 were not supported by any of the three studies. 
 
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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The present research consisted of three studies assessing different deception contexts. The 
contexts ranged from a private space to a public space, involving both manipulations such as 
risks of deception detection and reconnaissance, and contexts that cannot be manipulated 
(e.g., passersby as an audience when the deception is conducted in a public space). In 
addition to investigating deception that can happen in regular life (Study 1), we simulated 
deception tasks that may occur in specific instances and could violate public safety (e.g., 
deceiving a member of security staff in Study 2 and the reconnaissance task in Study 3) in 
order to compare the findings from such different settings.  
The findings (shown as either significant or a trend of significance) from Studies 1 and 
3 in relation to deception suggest the involvement of the fundamental psychological 
processes related to deception. The trend in trunk and limb movement reductions indicates 
nonverbal cues in relation to negative emotions (Vrij, 2008), cognitive overload (Ekman, 
1997; Memon et al., 2003), and behavioral control (Meservy et al., 2005; Vrij et al., 1997), 
whereas the increased positive affect observed in liars provides evidence of positive emotions 
associated with deception (Memon et al., 2003). In addition, the present research indicates 
that the deception cue of limb reduction is found for situations under which deceivers are 
standing (in Study 1) or moving around (in Study 3) and therefore extends the traditional 
paradigm of using seated participants with an interviewer in laboratory settings.  
The findings in Studies 1 and 2 suggest that reduction in hand movements related to the 
cognitive effort and attempted behavioral control processes might be magnified when the 
level of risks are raised. However, since there is no significant difference in Study 1 and 
across levels of risks in Study 2, this needs to be assessed in future studies. Nonetheless, 
Study 2 partially supports our proposition that risks can enhance differences in nonverbal 
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behavior between deceivers and truth-tellers. The difference in nonverbal cues was not 
significant across the three levels of risks, but the extent of impression of tension was greater 
in the highest risk (security evaluation) level than the other two lower risk levels. This might 
be due to the fact that higher risks place greater self-regulation demands on a person, 
subsequently leading to depletion in self-regulation. The self-depletion results in one’s failure 
of regulating such behaviors properly (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000). Notably, the cues associated with induced risks were also presented by truth-tellers, 
suggesting a need for future research endeavoring to solve the dilemma of discriminating 
liars from truth-tellers who might behave like deceivers (DePaulo, 1992; Ofshe & Leo, 
1997). Similarly, the impression of negative affect was also significantly increased in the 
highest risk level, compared to the other two levels. This trend was only significant in 
deceivers, suggesting a possible solution to discriminate deceivers from truth-tellers by 
observing the extent of negative affect across risk levels. However, since the results did not 
show a robust difference across all three levels, further studies are needed for testing this 
nonverbal impression. Nonetheless, the findings about the significant increase in nonverbal 
cues in the highest risk overwhelming the other levels suggest that a security check (as 
simulated in Study 2) might influence deceivers’ and/or truth-tellers’ behavior. We thus 
suggest this should be brought to the attention of security/public safety practitioners.  
In relation to the controlled covariates, age and gender were found to be significantly 
related to reduction in hand movement whilst telling lies. Age also influenced tension 
impressions related to risks. An explanation is that age and gender can influence nonverbal 
behavior exhibited by individuals and in line with evidence of age and cultural influences on 
nonverbal behavior (Vrij, 2008; Vrij & Winkel, 1991), our result suggests that the effect of 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
such variables should not be neglected in future research and failing to take these into 
account may adversely impact the validity of results. 
This research may have limitations regarding the stakes of deception introduced in 
experiments, which are not as dramatic as those in real life deception situations such as 
terrorist activities. However, the risk assessed in this study concerns the probability of being 
detected. Participants were aware that the confederate they met in the highest risk level was 
good in detecting lies. This had introduced a higher probability of detection than the other 
two levels (either no evaluator or no evaluation was performed). A further limitation is that in 
Study 2, deceivers read an extra article about deception. Although the article did not include 
information about nonverbal cues to deception, it might still have had an effect on the 
psychological processes that deceivers experienced and thus might indirectly influence 
deceivers’ behavior. Researchers conducting future deception studies might want to consider 
such potential effects while designing their own experimental materials. The ecological 
validity of lies performed in laboratory studies is a recognized limitation in deception 
research (Koning et al., 2011). Nevertheless, when deception tasks in laboratories are 
assigned to participants, the cognitive processes still influence behavioral control and shapes 
behavior (Hadar et al., 2012; Ito et al., 2012; Kozel et al., 2005).  
No significant deception cues were found in Study 2 whilst in the other studies these 
were apparent. This was possibly because participants were seated throughout this study, 
reducing the presence of visible nonverbal cues (e.g., trunk movements). If this is upheld in 
more studies there is evidence from these findings that it is important to consider a range of 
situational variables including the context where deception happens. The nonverbal cues 
assessed in the present research could be observed by people without relying on any detection 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
techniques. However, the nonverbal cues found in these studies require further testing in in 
order to investigate if such differences could be identified easily.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Taken as a whole, the findings demonstrate and contribute to both theory and practice by 
extending the existing evidence base with regard to deception-related behaviors across three 
situations. This work is another step forward in identifying more clearly the difference 
between deceivers and truth-tellers in settings other than interview situations. The 
implications of this research could be important for security stakeholders in many settings as 
they continually strive to make improvements to methods of deception detection. A focus on 
observable nonverbal cues could benefit security officials who are not able to directly interact 
with suspect individuals and who do not use detailed behavioral analysis when a judgment of 
deception is needed immediately. In addition, the present research provides evidence of 
nonverbal deception cues, and sheds light on effective manipulations, which may further help 
to increase deception detection accuracy.  
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CAPTIONS 
 
Table I. Coding of nonverbal cues - Body sections excluding hand/arm  
 
Table II. Coding of nonverbal cues - Hand/arm 
 
Table III. Coding of nonverbal cues – Impressions  
 
Table IV. ANCOVA results for Study 1
a
 
 
Table V. ANCOVA results for Study 2
a
 
 
Table VI. ANCOVA results for Study 3
a 
 
Captions
 Table I 
 
Body sections
a 
Variable name
a 
(movements) 
Coding Details 
(frequency/length) 
Head Head movement 
(all studies) 
All types (e.g. nod, shake, turn, tilt, etc) 
   
Eye
 Aversion/shifts 
(all studies) 
Brief change of gaze direction 
Staring at other places  
(Study 1 and 2) 
Fixed gaze direction 
Staring at folder  
(Study 2) 
Fixed gaze in the direction of the folder 
Eye contact aversion    
(Study 3) 
Avoiding eye contact with passersby 
Eye/eyebrow 
(all studies) 
Other eye movements to those above 
   
Trunk
 
Indirect orientation while 
standing 
(Study 1) 
Tilting at waist while being spoken to 
 
Lean towards other people 
while seated (Study 2) 
Body moving toward people being talked to 
 
Lean back while seated 
(Study 2) 
Body moving away from people being talked 
to 
Position shift 
(Study 2) 
Changes to the way of sitting that involve 
multiple body parts 
Sway 
(Study 3) 
Waist moving slowly or rhythmically from 
side to side 
 
Foot/Leg Feet and legs 
(all studies) 
Movements of legs and feet together 
Foot only 
(all studies) 
Movements of feet without moving legs 
Leg only 
(all studies) 
Movements of legs without moving feet 
Note. 
a
Body sections/movements in Bold were included in the analysis (according to the 
filtering steps stated in section 2). 
Table1
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II  
 
Body sections
a 
Variable name
a 
(movements) 
Coding Details 
(frequency/length) 
Hands/arms
 
Hands and arms 
(all studies) 
Movement of hands and arms together 
 
Hands only 
(all studies) 
Movement of hands without moving arms 
 
Crossing arms 
(all studies) 
Arms crossed in front of chest 
 
Hand(s) in pocket(s) 
(all studies) 
Gesture of hand(s) in pocket(s) 
 
Hand holding 
(Study 1 and 2) 
Two hands hold together in front/behind 
trunk 
Hand hiding and legs 
(Study 2) 
Holding hands between knees 
 
Hand and objects 
(Study 3) 
Movements of hands holding bag or objects 
 
Note. 
a
Body sections/movements in Bold were included in the analysis (according to the 
filtering steps stated in section 2). 
Table2
Table III 
 
Three Processes 
Variable Name
 
(impressions) 
Coding Details 
(the degree of impressions) 
Emotion Positive affect
 
Being pleased in general throughout the session 
Negative affect Being unpleased in general throughout the session 
Tension
a 
 
Being tense and not being relaxed in general 
throughout the session 
   
Cognitive effort Thinking hard  
 
Being considering carefully while talking (about the 
card/folder/name) 
   
Attempted 
behavioral control 
Attempted control Attempting to manipulate behavior 
Rigid  Being stiff and rigid while moving  
   
Task-related Looking around 
(Study 3) 
Observing the environment 
 
Note. 
a
Tension was calculated by averaging the score of ‘being tense’ and the reverse 
score of ‘being relaxed.’ All variables listed were included in data analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table3
  
 
Table IV 
 
 
Deception 
 
Level of Risks 
F df p ηp
2 
F df p ηp
2 
Movements and Covariates
a
          
Hand and arm* 1.14 1, 21 .30 .05  4.29 1, 21 .51 .17 
Age 1.58 1, 21 .22 .07  1.58 1, 21 .22  .07 
Gender 1.23 1, 21 .28 .06  1.23 1, 21 .28 .06 
Western/Non-western 0.63 1, 21 .44 .03  0.63 1, 21 .44 .03 
Hand holding** 4.75 1, 21 .04 .18  2.24 1, 21 .15 .10 
Age 5.62 1, 21 .03 .21  5.62 1, 21 .03 .21 
Gender 6.98 1, 21 .02 .25  6.98 1, 21 .02 .25 
Western/Non-western 0.01 1, 21 .94 .00  0.01 1, 21 .94 .00 
Note. 
aInsignificant dependent variables were not listed. ηp
2
 = effect size estimate – partial eta 
squared. **Significant effect of variables: p < .05 states in Bold; *trend of significant effect 
of variables: P < .055 states in Bold.  
Table4
 Table V 
 
 
Deception 
 
Level of Risks 
F df p ηp
2 
F df p ηp
2 
Movements and Covariates
a
          
Hand holding** 0.10 1, 28 .75 .00  3.46 2, 56 .04 .11 
Age 0.60 1, 28 .45 .02  0.44 2, 56 .65 .02 
Gender 1.40 1, 28 .25 .05  0.18 2, 56 .84 .01 
Western/Non-western 1.15 1, 28 .29 .04  1.83 2, 56 .17 .06 
Impressions and Covariates
a
          
Tension**
b 
0.52 1, 28 .48 .02  3.92 1.63, 45.52 .04 .12 
Age 0.11 1, 28 .74 .00  4.74 1.63, 45.52 .02 .15 
Gender 0.38 1, 28 .54 .01  2.31 1.63, 45.52 .12 .08 
Western/Non-western 0.00 1, 28 1.00 .00  0.64 1.63, 45.52 .08 .09 
Negative affect** 0.91 1, 28 .35 .03  4.24 2, 56 .02 .13 
Age 1.67 1, 28 .21 .06  0.18 2, 56 .84 .01 
Gender 0.05 1, 28 .82 .00  1.08 2, 56 .35 .04 
Western/Non-western 0.00 1, 28 .99 .00  1.10 2, 56 .34 .04 
Note. 
aInsignificant dependent variables were not listed. ηp
2
 = effect size estimate – partial eta 
squared. **Significant effect of variables: p < .05 states in Bold. 
b
Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction figures presented for the condition of level of risks. 
 
Table5
Table VI 
 
 
Deception 
 
Reconnaissance 
F df p ηp
2 
F df p ηp
2 
Movements and Covariates
a
          
Eye/eye brow** 0.07 1, 85 .80 .00  5.68 1, 85 .02 .06 
Age 2.29 1, 85 .13 .03  2.29 1, 85 .13 .03 
Gender 0.08 1, 85 .78 .00  0.08 1, 85 .78 .00 
Western/Non-western 0.62 1, 85 .44 .01  0.62 1, 85 .44 .01 
Trunk* 3.82 1, 85 .05 .04  3.62 1, 85 .06 .04 
Age 0.00 1, 85 .99 .00  0.00 1, 85 .99 .00 
Gender 0.03 1, 85 .86 .00  0.03 1, 85 .86 .00 
Western/Non-western 1.67 1, 85 .20 .02  1.67 1, 85 .20 .02 
Hand and arm* 3.85 1, 85 .05 .04  0.60 1, 85 .44 .01 
Age 3.93 1, 85 .05 .04  3.93 1, 85 .05 .04 
Gender 4.76 1, 85 .03 .05  4.76 1, 85 .03 .05 
Western/Non-western 0.03 1, 85 .87 .00  0.03 1, 85 .87 .00 
Impressions and Covariates
a
          
Positive affect** 5.94 1, 85 .02 .07  0.36 1, 85 .55 .00 
Age 1.39 1, 85 .24 .02  1.39 1, 85 .24 .02 
Gender 0.44 1, 85 .51 .01  0.44 1, 85 .51 .01 
Western/Non-western 0.35 1, 85 .56 .00  0.35 1, 85 .56 .00 
Note. 
a
Insignificant dependent variables were not listed. ηp
2
 = effect size estimate – partial eta 
squared. **Significant effect of variables: p < .05 states in Bold; *trend of significant effect 
of variables: P < .055 states in Bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table6
